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Abstract
This paper examines one of the most important marketing strategies by software produc-
ers on the Internet. That is whether to offer free samples and if so, whether to list the samples
on shareware repositories. I show that rms with higher value products have a greater incen-
tive to offer free samples but are more reluctant to do so if they are well known, and even
when they do are less likely to be listed on shareware repositories. I then proceed to use four
types of Probit-based models to corroborate the ndings from the theoretical model.
JEL Classications: D42, D43, D82, D83, L13, L15, L81, L86.
Keywords: Shareware; Software; Internet; Distribution; Intermediation; Directory; Repos-
itory; Advertising; Brand; Reputation; Asymmetric Information; Search; Sample.
This paper examines strategies in the marketing of experience goods over the internet. I want
to explain the variety of strategies that are observed on the Internet when it comes to offering
samples of one's product or not. I focus specically on how offering samples gives access to
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better distribution opportunities on the Internet. The paper uses software marketing as an exam-
ple, but the model and its reasoning applies to any situation where rms can offer free samples
of their products at little costs to themselves. For example, an online newspaper such as Econo-
mist.com may offer the rst paragraphs of an article for free, a book seller such as Amazon.com
may provide access to the rst few pages of a book, a dating site such as Match.com may provide
basic features free, and so on. Alongside those websites, there are intermediaries that provide
access to those samples and then direct consumers back to the websites where products are sold.
For example my.yahoo.com provides a news aggregation service for information services such
as Reuter, AFP and others. books.google.co.uk offers access to extended excerpts of books and
provides links to book retailers who sell the book. Download.com lists software for which trial
versions are available. JSTOR gives access to the abstract and sometimes the rst few pages of
the papers in journals to which one is not subscribed, and so on. Bourreau and Lethiais (2007)
give statistics on the extent to which marketing strategies based on the offering of free products
are used on the Internet.
I focus in this paper on software distribution and marketing. Software may be offered as
shareware, free on a trial basis. Shareware may have a built-in expiration date (after 30 days,
the user can no longer get access to the program), or it may have some features disabled. After
the trial period or in order to have access to the missing features, the consumer must buy the
complete version of the program. Software publishers can offer shareware on their own website,
or they can list their sample on a shareware repository. Savvy consumers will nd software via
a search engine or a shareware repository. Software publishers that are well-known are likely to
come out on top in search results, but if the search is specic, then search results will also include
specialized software publishers even if they are not very well known. Search results will also
include shareware repositories. If the consumer chooses to consult a repository, then she will nd
out about a great number of software responding to her need and will be able to easily compare
them by popularity, feedback from other consumers and of course by the features they provide.
Consumers without access to the Internet, consumers who distrust online retailing and newcomers
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to the Internet are more likely to know of and buy only from well-known publisher, such as those
publishers that have a wide product line and that do brand advertising, are established players in
the industry or have established a dominant position in one or many development areas.
Basic listing on the repository is usually free, though rms may choose to pay a fee for prefer-
ential placement.1 Software is only checked for viruses, and spyware (software that collects pri-
vate information) is normally excluded. Other than those cursory checkups, any software can be
listed. Repositories attract clients and thus advertising revenues by offering an easily searchable
central place with a wide diversity of software. Repositories do not usually handle transactions
between the software publisher and the rm: once a consumer has sampled one rm's product
and decided to buy it, she is directed to that rm's website. Repositories do not also usually
play a role as a certier, but consumers can rank results by the number of times one software
was downloaded (Duan, Gu, and Whinston (2005) and Duan, Gu, and Whinston (2006) exam-
ine whether consumers will respond to that information). Repositories may however sell some
add-on services (registering customers, processing payment, etc.). Some repositories are highly
visible on the Internet and attract a great number of consumers (table in appendix B). While
offering samples on the repositories reaches many consumers, it puts one in direct competition
with existing alternatives. There is little other possible outlet however for those rms that nd it
the most difcult to nd consumers (new entrants, niche products). This paper will contrast the
strategies of the better known software publishers (Microsoft, Adobe, Apple) with that of sec-
ond tier software publishers (Intuit, Symantec, Avanquest) and that of relatively obscure software
publishers, such as Corel, Nova Development or Pantone. Better known software publishers will
be shown to prefer not to offer samples of their product, while second tier publishers will offer
samples on their website but not list their product on the repositories, thus avoiding competition.
Lower tier publisher will have no other recourse than listing their product on the repositories.
Firms' strategies will thus have two dimensions: offer samples or not, and if so, list the sample
on the repository or only on their website.
1See Bhargava and Feng (2006) and Bhargava and Feng (2007) for an analysis of possible fee induced bias in
search results.
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Literature This paper is positioned among a large group of literature addressing the in-
centives for sample provision on the Internet. Its main contribution lies in the framework, both
the theoretical model and the empirical testing, that links not only pricing, but marketing strate-
gies with rm identities. The paper provides an insight into two signicant factors inuencing
the sample provision decisions, i.e. what information delivery channel to use (own website or
software repository) and which consumers to target (informed vs. uninformed). The following
literature review considers other factors.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Grossman (1981) consider that offering samples is one way
to reduce consumer uncertainty when buying experience goods. Firms that offer samples of their
products may decide to do so to increase willingness to pay but also to prevent being mixed up
with low value software. Competition between rms faced with an imperfectly informed con-
sumer leads them to disclose information about their product. In the same setting, Bourreau and
Lethiais (2007) consider the cost of offering a portion of one's product for free and show that high
value sellers will signal their value by offering samples. Boom (2004) reaches similar conclu-
sions. Similar to this paper, Waldfogel and Chen (2006) consider how providing information via
third parties may undermine the role of brand and reputation. However, internet intermediaries
such as price comparison websites face their own reputational issues (Leggatt (2007)), so much
so that consumers who used them in the past now tend to prefer going directly to well-known
brands' websites.
Haruvy and Prasad (2005) consider that samples may be offered to build up a user base
when network effects are important. In the special case of software such as Adobe Acrobat, a
document preparation system, a rm may offer a free version of its software that only allows
reading, listening or using documents, music or other types of les that were created using the
full version of the software. This increases the audience for the users of the full version. In
that case the free version does not only prove the value of the output generated using the full
version, but also increases the value of the product to those who pay for the full version. The
software publishers take into account two-sided market effects, attracting one side (non-paying
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content consumers) to better attract paying content producers (Jullien (2005)). The same dynamic
arguments can be made from reading Crémer (1984) and Villas-Boas (2006): samples may be
offered to build up an informational advantage: a consumer knows more about a product she has
tried than about a product she has not tried, so she is likely to become a regular customer after
trying. Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) show that niche players will price low at the beginning
so as to attract buyers while mass market players can price high and still get customers. Samples
may also be offered to generate positive word of mouth; some lead consumers may be provided
with free advance versions of a soon-to-be-launched product.2 Finally, offering samples may be
a way to impose or promote a standard in an industry: there is strong competition to become
the dominant platform for music downloads so competitors offer free basic versions of their own
music reader with their own standards (Apple's AAC/FairPlay vs. Microsoft's Windows Media
Audio).
Lethiais (2001) considers that samples and other free content may be offered to generate
advertising revenues. This is the case of Opera, a web browser, that offers three versions of its
product: a basic one that is free, a more advanced one that is free but displays advertising, and
nally, a full version that one has to pay for but that is free from advertising. Livejournal, a blog
aggregator, also offers such a scheme. More worryingly, such `adware' can turn into `spyware',
software that collects information about the user and reports it back to the software publisher
who generates money by reselling that information to interested third parties, usually marketers.
Offering samples may thus allow better rent extraction. Consumers with low willingness to pay
have to endure advertising, consumers with high willingness to pay buy their way out of this
by getting the full version of the product. Varian (2000) gives general theoretical arguments
for versioning, Shapiro and Varian (1998) apply them to the business context and Ghose and
Sundararajan (2005) undertake an empirical study of software versioning. Note that software
publishers may expect those consumers with low willingness to pay to turn into consumers with
high willingness to pay later on, who then buy software they became locked into through the use
of its free version.
2See Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) for an application to the online context.
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I present a table in appendix C that classies Internet retailing strategies that consist of offer-
ing free samples, free products or reduced prices. Examples of rms following those strategies
are given, along with the explanation for their choice of strategy according to the literature ex-
posed above. The contribution of this paper is to complement the `value signaling' explanation
for offering sample with an `enhanced distribution' explanation. I examine in the model presented
below the implications of assuming that offering samples gives access to enhanced distribution
potentials. I then test the predictions from the model from data collected on the Internet. The
paper concludes with an assessment of the accuracy of the model's predictions, some alternative
explanations for the empirical ndings, and some questions for future research.
1 The model
Consider a rm i selling a product of value i to a unit mass of consumers. i is known to the
rm i but not to the consumers. Consumers expect value  to be distributed according to the
uniform probability density function over [0; ]; bounded. The rm can choose to offer a sample
or not. The rm incurs no cost in doing so, the sample is free and the consumer incurs no cost in
trying the product. If rm i offers a sample, then the consumer learns its value i: Portion i of
consumers are aware of the existence of the rm i (`brand awareness' or `visibility') and of no
others. This variable i is a measure of the prominence of the `virtual location' of the website
(Häring (2003)). Portion  of consumers independently visit a repository where a sample for
a competing rm with a product of net value a > 0 (`alternative') is offered. The rm can
list its product on the repository only if it offers a sample. If it lists on the repository, then those
consumers who visit the repository learn of the product of rm i along with that of the alternative.
The rmmust offer the same price to all consumers. I will assume that consumers' expected value
for rm i's product when that rm does not offer a sample corresponds to the expected value of
the product of such a rm in equilibrium (this is the rational expectations hypothesis).
Suppose the rm does not offer samples. Denote NS the expected value of the product of
a rm that does not offer a sample. Portion i(1   ) of consumers visit the rm but not the
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repository, learn there is no sample available from i and buy s.t. NS   p  0: Portion i of
consumers visit the rm and the repository, learn there is no sample available from i but that there
is an alternative of net value a and buy product i s.t. NS   p  a: Firm i then has two choices.
It can choose strategy NS under which it sells at p = NS and makes prot:
(1) NS = i(1  )NS
or it can choose strategy (NS,a) under which it sells at p = NS   a and makes prot
(2) NS;a = i(NS   a)
The rm will prefer the latter to the former s.t. NS > a ; i.e. if consumers are relatively
optimistic about the value of the rm's good.
Note that the strategy that consists of offering no sample and listing on the repository is not
feasible as repositories require a sample to be listed.
Suppose now the rm offers a sample. It will list on the repository since doing so potentially
allows it to reach a wider portion of consumers. The rm will sell from its own website s.t.
i   pi > 0 and from the repository s.t. i   pi > a: If the rm wishes to sell on the repository,
then it must set price pi = i  a: Note that this means the rm will never list on the repository if
i < a: Denote the strategy consisting of offering a sample and selling on the repository as `S,R'.
Prot is then:
(3) S;R = (i(1  ) + )(i   a)
Denote the strategy consisting of offering a sample but not selling on the repository as `S,NR'.
The rm then sets price pi = i and makes prot
(4) S;NR = i(1  )i
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In the following remark, I note that samples will be offered by at least some rms. This is
because if no sample is offered, then consumers buy only if the expected value of software is high
enough. Under the rational expectations hypothesis, that expected value is the average value of
the software of those rms that do not offer sample. Then, rms that are above that average will
want to prove this by offering samples.
Remark 1 At least some rms will offer samples, and those will have products of higher value
than rms not offering samples.
Proof. Suppose no rms offer samples. Then, in a rational expectations equilibrium, NS = 2
(consumers' expectations correspond to the expected value of the product of a rm that does not
offer samples). But then rms with higher than average value will prefer (S,NR) to (NS), and
(S,R) to (NS,a) as in both case they can sell to more consumers at a higher price. Therefore, I
cannot have all rms not offering samples.
The following remark follows from the previous one and looks at the expression of prot in
the case where strategy (NS,a) is chosen. It shows that if the alternative on the repository is too
good (better than the average value of software in the industry), then rms will not want to adopt
strategy (NS,a), and will sell only to those consumers who are not aware of the repository.
Remark 2 If a > 
2
then rm will never choose strategy (NS,a).
Proof. Note that 
2
is the best a-priori a rm that does not offer samples may have in a rational
expectations equilibrium (this is the a-priori when no rm offer samples. In all other cases, from
remark 1, it is higher value rms that offer samples so the a-priori on rms that do not offer
samples decreases). This means that if a > 
2
then the rm would make negative prots with
strategy (NS,a) while its prots would be positive with strategy (NS) for example.
The following remark notes that rms with high value and low brand awareness prefer strat-
egy (S,R) to strategy (S,NR). This is because rms with high value products can compete effec-
tively against the alternative and will do so if the additional sales on the repository are important
to them, which is true of those rms with lower brand awareness.
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Remark 3 Among rms that offer samples, rms with high value products and/or rms with
low brand awareness will make sales via the repository while the others will sell only via their
website.
Proof. A rm that offers a sample will sell on the repository s.t. S;R > S;NR; that is, if
i > a(1 +
1 

i):
The following proposition establishes when rms will not offer samples. There is unraveling
of expectations. Consumers assume the value of those rms that do not offer samples is low
and this leads rms with higher value software to offer samples. It is not possible to sustain an
optimistic equilibrium whereby consumers would assume the value of those rms that do not
offer samples is high so rms with high value software do not offer sample.
Proposition 1 There is a unique rational expectations equilibrium where only rms with value
i = 0 do not offer samples.
Proof. A) Suppose a < 
2
so strategy (NS,a) may be used (see remark 2).
Suppose NS < a : Then rm i will choose strategy (NS) rather than (NS,a). It prefers (NS)
to (S,NR) s.t. i < NS and (NS) vs. (S,R) s.t. i <
i(1 )
i(1 )+
NS + a: Strategy (NS) is thus
preferred for any i < min[NS;
i(1 )
i(1 )+
NS + a]: This means that for NS < a(i(1  ) + )
then the rm chooses strategy (NS) whenever i < NS , while for NS 2 [ a(i(1   ) + );
a

]
then it chooses strategy (NS) whenever i <
i(1 )
i(1 )+
NS + a:
Suppose now NS > a : Then rm i will choose strategy (NS,a) rather than (NS). It prefers
strategy (NS,a) vs. (S,NR) s.t. i < 11 (NS a) and (NS,a) vs. (S,R) s.t. i <
i
i(1 )+
(NS 
a)+a: Strategy (NS,a) is thus preferred for any i < min[ 11 (NS a);
i
i(1 )+
(NS a)+a]:
However, 1
1 
(NS a) >
i
i(1 )+
(NS a)+a for any NS > (+(1 )(i(1 )+)) a ;
which is less than a

and is therefore true in the denition interval. This means that for any
NS >
a

then the rm does not offer samples for any i <
i
i(1 )+
(NS   a) + a:
Now, from the above, for any NS < (i(1 )+) a , then the rm does not offer samples for
any i < NS: In a rational expectations equilibrium, I must have NS = E(iji < NS) = 12NS:
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Solving this for NS gives out NS = 0: I can check that this solution is within its domain of
denition, so this constitutes a rational expectations equilibrium.
Suppose now (i(1   ) + ) a < NS <
a

; then the rm does not offer samples for any
i <
i(1 )
i(1 )+
NS + a: In a rational expectations equilibrium, I must have NS = E(iji <
i(1 )
i(1 )+
NS+a) =
1
2
( i(1 )
i(1 )+
NS+a): Solving this for NS gives out NS = a
i(1 )+
i(1 )+2
: I can
check that this solution is not within its domain of denition as a i(1 )+
i(1 )+2
< (i(1  ) + )
a

,
so this does not constitute a rational expectations equilibrium.
Suppose now NS > a : Then as seen above, I can check that the rm will not offer samples
for any i <
i
i(1 )+
(NS   a) + a: In a rational expectations equilibrium, I must have NS =
E(iji <
i
i(1 )+
(NS   a) + a) =
1
2
i
i(1 )+
(NS   a) + a: Solving this for NS gives out
NS =
(1 i)
2(1 i)+i
a; which is less than a

so there is no rational expectations equilibrium in that
interval.
B) Suppose now a > 
2
so strategy (NS,a) may not be used (see remark 2). Then again the
only equilibrium is such that rm of value i = 0 do not offer samples, and other rms choose
strategy (S,R) s.t. i > a+ a
1 

i; and (S,NR) otherwise.
This proposition allows me to dene several zones in the reputation/value space where rms
will choose strategies (S,R), (S,NR), (NS) or (NS,a) depending on the nature of the equilibrium
and their characteristics (i; i): rms will never choose strategy (NS,a) and only rms with a
product of value 0 do not offer samples. The rest of the rms choose their strategy according to
remark 3. In the following, I will show the result of internalizing the value of a as the maximum
net utility gained from any rms on the repository. This choice of denition for a is based on the
assumption that consumers are able to accurately identify the best deal from all rms listed on the
repository. Intuitively, both value and visibility inuence the decision to sell on the repository;
the rms with the highest value will not fear competition from other rms, and will be all the
more motivated to list on the repository as they are less visible on the Internet. This means that
the higher the value and the lower the visibility, the more likely the rm will be to list on the
repository.
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Proposition 2 Only rms with the highest ratio
j
1+ 1 

j
in the universe of rms may sell via the
repository.
Proof. Consider two rms i and j and suppose one of them, j; is listed on the repository. Take as
the value of a the net utility from buying from that rm, so a = j   pj: Suppose rm i considers
whether to sell via the repository as well, in which case it must set its price pi = i a; otherwise
it would make no sales via the repository. I thus have pi = i   j + pj: From remark 3, rm i
will list on the repository s.t. i > (j   pj)(1 +
1 

i). Firm j has two options: either set its
price such that rm i does not enter the repository, so it has to set its price pj = j  
i
1+ 1 

i
and makes prot (j(1   ) + )(j  
i
1+ 1 

i
); or allow rm i in, in which case it makes no
sales via the repository (only one rm makes sales on the repository, and rm i will enter only if
it makes sales on the repository). In that latter case, rm j is reduced to sell via its own website
at price pj = j and makes prot j(1   )j: Firm j will want to stay on the repository only if
(j(1  ) + )(j  
i
1+ 1 

i
) > j(1  )j; which translates into
j
1+ 1 

j
> i
1+ 1 

i
: It will
be indifferent between staying on the repository or leaving if j
1+ 1 

j
= i
1+ 1 

i
:
This means that only rms with the highest ratio j
1+ 1 

j
may list on the repository, and none
of the others will. That value j
1+ 1 

j
is what was referred to as `a' previously.
In a universe with an innity of rms spanning the whole range of possible brand recognition
and value, then, among those rms that offer samples, only the rm with the highest value ( = )
and the lowest reputation ( = 0) will sell via the repository. The following corrolary examines
the consequences of having a bound h on the value of the ratio j
1+ 1 

j
in the above proposition.
In that case, there will be a range of rms that may be listing on the repository:
Corollary 1 Suppose there is a bound h   to the value of the ratio
j
1+ 1 

j
over all rms.
Consider the set of rms with ratio equal to h. Then only those rms may sell via the repository.
They will set their prices as an increasing function of their visibility j; such that pj = h
1 

j .
Proof. Suppose there is a bound h   to the ratio's value, then all rms with j
1+ 1 

j
= h may
list on the repository and will price at pj = j   h: There will thus be a relationship such that
pj = h
1 

j; so that price and visibility will be positively correlated.
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The following graph (Figure 1) illustrates proposition 1 and its corollary 1.  ranges from
0 to 1 and  ranges from 0 to : The hashed area is devoid of rms. On the right of the graph,
bordering the limit of the hashed area, are those rms that use strategy (S,R). On the left are those
rms with the lowest value products, that offer no samples. In between the two lines are all the
rms using strategy (S,NR).
Quality
V
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S,NR
S,R
?
?h h?
Figure 1: Graphical representation of strategies in the (; ) space.
I can now summarize the results from the model into the following hypotheses, which I will
then test in the empirical part:
H1: Firms will use three types of strategies, either not offering samples or offering samples,
and when offering samples, either selling via the repository or not (remark 3 and proposition 1).
H2: Everything else being equal, publishers with lower value products are less likely to offer
samples (proposition 1).
H3: Among those rms that offer samples, those with higher value products are more likely
to be selling via the repository (remark 3).
H4: Among those rms that offer samples, those with better visibility are less likely to be
selling via the repository than less well known publishers (remark 3).
H5: Among those rms that offer samples and sell via the repository, there will be a positive
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correlation between price and visibility. There will be no such correlation among other rms
(corollary 1 to proposition 2).
2 Empirical analysis
I selected software in May 2006 from two databases, CNET download.com which is the dom-
inant shareware repository (see table in appendix B), and amazon.com, a dominant Internet re-
tailer. Software in each database is classied by category, and both data sources classify soft-
ware broadly along the same scheme. Software that was patently misclassied was excluded.
Six categories were selected for further data collection: databases, word processors, image edit-
ing, personal nance, software and programming. Software listed on CNET download.com was
ranked by the number of times consumers downloaded the software. The top ten software were
selected.3 Similarly, the top ten software by sales in each category were selected from ama-
zon.com. I checked through the Google search engine that this sampling did not miss any im-
portant software in each category. Software that appeared among the top ten results from Google
when searching for software in a category was also included if it did not appear already, which
happened only once. This sample selection strategy, where Google search results complement
data from internet retailers and repositories, is a combination of techniques employed in Häring
(2003) or Clay, Krishnan, and Wolff (2001) for example. There was very little overlay between
software sampled on download.com and on amazon.com as only two software was listed among
the top ten on both repositories. The total sample size was 116. The sample was distributed
3Since listing on the repository is free, all software that offers samples will potentially list on the repository even
if its price is too high to compete. This is why I selected only the top ten software on the repository. Software
that was listed among the top ten downloads on the repository was included not only because more downloads
presumably means more sales, but also because consumers tend to choose relative popularity as their main way to
arrange software listing when searching a repository (Duan, Gu, and Whinston (2006)) and will tend to ignore any
software that does not appear on the rst page of results.
One could also have selected software by the total number of downloads on the repository. However, the length of
time the product was available differs greatly rm by rm, so a product that appears to have been downloaded often
may have been so because it has been listed for a long time. As an alternative, taking the daily average of downloads
does not either take into account the difference between older product that were present when download.com was
starting, and newer products that benet from the present popularity of this site. Moreover, recently listed products
often display high daily download numbers because of novelty, and this number then tapers off in a way that is
difcult to predict. Using the `number of downloads last week' suffers from the same novelty bias.
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among categories and strategies as follows (Table 1):
Strategy
Category S,R S,NR NS Total
Backup 10 1 9 20
Database 10 5 2 17
Illustration 10 6 4 20
Personal nance 10 3 7 20
Programming 10 5 4 19
Word processors 11 6 3 20
Total 61 26 29 116
Table 1: Sample composition, by category and strategy
Information was collected on the price of the software, the availability of samples on the
software publisher's website, the terms under which samples were distributed, the number of
backlinks to the internet address of the software publisher, the ratings of the software by users at
amazon.com and download.com and the rating by the editors at download.com.4
 The number of websites linking to a publisher's website (`backlinks') was used as a proxy
for visibility  and was collected through Google. Typing link:www.websitename.com
in the Google search query eld returns the number ni of `backlinks' to website i. This
is a measure of visibility on the Internet that Google, the dominant search engine, uses to
determine the ranking of that website in response to a specic query: a website that is linked
to more often will be listed before a website that is linked to less often if both websites,
through automated content analysis, seem to t the consumer's query equally adequately
(see Weiss (2005) for a discussion of the robustness of this measure of visibility). The
number of backlinks will be converted in logarithmic scale. This is because the higher the
number of links the lower is the contribution of one additional link in terms of likelihood
to be found.5
4Other data on CNET download.com was collected as well, including the size of the downloads, the number of
dowloads made since listing, `last week's downloads' and the number of ratings made.
5Consider for example, two sites 1 and 2; where n1 sites link to site 1 and n2 sites link to site 2: Suppose there
are N = n1 + n2 sites and all sites link either to site 1 or 2: In a random search the probability one nds a site that
links to site 1 is 1 =
n1
n1+n2
: The logarithm of n1 approximates the shape of this function.
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 Price will be used as a proxy for value : The alternative to using price as a measure of value
would be very data intensive and would involve designing comparable measures of value
across software categories.6 The model's prediction on the relation between the price of the
software, its visibility and the publisher's choice of strategy are analogous to the predictions
linking value, visibility and the choice of strategy. Indeed, whatever the strategy, price will
be increasing with value. This choice of proxy is based on the assumption that consumers
are not systematically wrong in their evaluation of offered alternatives. This choice also
assumes away such things as lock-in effects, brand premium from advertising, network
effects favoring the established players, etc... Denote pi is the price of software i; j the
category to which software i belongs. Two estimates of price were used, either from the
price quoted at the repository or on the software publisher's website.
 I experimented with another variable, ri, the rating of the software, as an alternative for the
use of price as a proxy for value. There were three such measures, user and editors rating at
download.com and user rating at amazon.com. Both of those measures were on a scale of
1 to 5 stars. Amazon and Download both provide guidelines as to the meaning of each star
category (appendix A). Ratings were available for 89 of the 116 software in the sample.7
In order to account for possible discrepancy between ratings at both websites, they were
estimated in relative terms vs. the average rating of software on the same repository.8
Software that receives lower rating by consumers may be less likely to be available as
shareware so as to hide its type. Alternatively, low rated publishers may wish to offer
samples to reassure the consumers that its product is underrated.
 I also used another variables as an alternative for `backlinks', which measures visibility.
6There are some examples of the use of price as a measure of value in the literature on cross industry analysis of
intra-industry trade (Greenaway, Hine, and Milner (1995)).
7Ratings based on less than 5 opinions were ignored unless, in the case of Amazon.com, a sufcient number of
consumers signaled the reviews were useful (indeed, a review can be so `denitive' that no reviewers would submit
additional reviews).
8User ratings do not necessarily express the absolute value level of the software, or even its value in relative terms
vis-à-vis the competition, but its value vs. what the consumer expected from the product. Products that are good
value for money or exceed expectations will therefore tend to be highly rated, rather than products that are of higher
value.
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wi, is an indicator categorizing publishers, taking value 1 if more than 4 software in the
sample belonged to the publisher of the software, and value 0 else. This will be a proxy
for `brand recognition'. Diversied publishers, whose products take value 1, are usually
either generalists like Microsoft and Apple, or publishers who have gained a position in
one software category (Symantec for anti-virus software, Avanquest for database software,
Adobe for illustration software, Intuit for nancial software). Software benets from the
reputation of their publisher; consumers may have used previous versions and will trust the
publishers. This makes offering samples or being listed on the repository less necessary.
Analysis Firms used the full set of strategies hypothesized in the model (H1). There was a
signicant relationship between price, visibility and the choice of strategy as seen in the following
scatter plot that relates visibility (lnni) and price with strategy (Figure 2):
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Figure 2: Price and number of backlinks, indexed by strategy.
As seen above, there are very few rms on the right of a diagonal starting from the origin
to the top right corner of the graph. This supports corollary 1. Firms that do not offer samples
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are on the left hand side of the graph, as hypothesized in H2. The prices of those rms that
adopt strategy (S,NR) do not seem to differ in a systematic way from the prices of those rms
that adopt strategy (S,R), which goes against hypothesis H3. Firms that offer samples and are
listed among the top ten downloads on the repository are primarily among the less well-known,
as hypothesized in H4. We will see there is a signicant correlation between price and visibility
among those rms (as hypothesized in H5), though this correlation also exists for those rms
using strategy (NS). Those observations on the empirical distribution of strategies in the sample
t well with the model as seen in Figure 1 and are globally in support of the hypotheses from the
model. In the following, I will test the statistical signicance of those observations.
Four probit based regressions were performed. The rst model (Probit 1) is a simple probit
model that predicts the decision to offer samples or not based on the variables collected. The
second model (Probit 2) considers the sub-sample of those rms that do offer samples, and uses
a simple probit model to predict the decision to list on the repository. I limit the regression
to this sub-sample because listing on the repository is only open to those rms that do offer
samples. A third model (Heckman Probit) uses a Heckman probit selection model (see Heckman
(1979)), thus using all the data available and taking into account the self-selection effect (rms
not offering samples exclude themselves from listing on the repository). The decision of rms
is thus supposed to be as follows: First choose whether to offer a sample or not, and if offering
a sample is chosen, then choose whether to sell via the repository or not. The decision to offer
a sample or not is therefore the selection variable, while the decision to list on the repository is
the outcome variable.9 A fourth model (Sartori) uses Sartori's estimator which is better t for
this special case in which identical explanatory factors inuence selection and the subsequent
outcome of interest (Sartori (2003)).
9One could also assume that rms rst choose whether to list on the repository. If they do so they have to
offer a sample. If they do not do so they can still choose to offer a sample on their website. However, one cannot
observe variations in the choice whether to offer samples or not among those selected rms that choose to list on the
repository. This is why one rst has to evaluate the decision whether to offer a sample or not, and then the decision
whether to list on the repository.
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Probit 1 Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 2 Heckman Sartori Sartori
Probit estimator estimator
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Dependent variable = 1 if available as sample, 0 else.
ln(backlinks) -0.239*** -0.152** -0.245*** -0.223*** -0.153**
(-4.74) (-2.30) (-4.92) (-4.84) (-2.45)
publisher (w) -0.821* -0.649
(-1.94) (-1.62)
price 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(2.96) (2.91) (3.11) (2.89) (2.75)
constant 1.861*** 1.568*** 1.883*** 1.750*** 1.520***
(5.40) (4.31) (5.58) (5.38) (4.39)
Dependent variable = 1 if available on the repository, 0 else
ln(backlinks) -0.202*** -0.157** -0.256*** -0.180***
(-3.45) (-2.23) (-5.48) (-3.09)
publisher (w) -0.542 -0.765** -0.817**
(-1.14) (-2.21) (-2.05)
price 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001
(0.33) (0.30) (1.67) (1.49)
constant 1.651*** 0.931*** 1.451*** 1.211***
(4.86) (5.89) (5.07) (4.02)
athrho constant -3.477
(-0.04)
Pseudo R-square 0.225 0.254 0.165 0.178
chi2 29.840 33.66 17.397 18.71 4.876 24.502 26.80
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000
N 116 116 86 86 116 116 116
Signicance levels: *<10% **<5% ***<1%, t-values in parenthesis.
Table 2: Estimation results
From table 2, the `Probit 1(1)' model shows that the websites of rms that offer samples have
higher prices (as hypothesized in H2) and they are signicantly less linked to than others. This
is easily understood in the context of the model, as rms with lower visibility have the most to
gain from offering samples as it opens access to listing on the repository. Whether the rm was
part of a diversied software publisher (wi = 1), an alternative measure of visibility, also made
it less likely to offer samples (Probit 1(2)), but ri (rating by consumers, an alternative measure of
value) was not a signicant predictors of the decision of the rm (results not shown).
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As a matter of interpretation of the results, take as the base case the average rm with price
pi = $140 and visibility ln(ni) = 6. Statistically, there is 80% probability that this average rm
will be observed to offer a sample. If its price was instead one standard deviation higher at $340,
everything else remaining the same, then this probability would be higher at 94%; while if its
price was $0; then this probability would be lower at 65%: If visibility was instead one standard
deviation higher at 9:5; then it would be observed to offer a sample with lower probability 63%,
while if visibility was instead 2:5, then this probability would be higher at 92%. As can be seen,
the effect of changing price and visibility by one standard deviation is about the same; both
factors have similar importance from a statistical point of view. This will also be the case in all
results exposed below.
The `Probit 2' model considers the sub-sample of rms that offer samples and examines their
decision to list on the repository. As hypothesized in H4, rms that are listed on the repository
are signicantly less linked to than rms that are not listed there. No variables in addition to ni
turned out to be signicant predictors, though wi performed almost as well as ni when replacing
it as a predictor (result not shown). This is because the two are correlated as multi-product rms
gain from brand visibility established among several products (The coefcient of correlation was
0.71, signicant at the 1% level).
The `Probit 1' and `Probit 2' models thus means that ni inuences both the decision to offer
a sample and to list on the repository, while from the model it should only inuence the decision
whether to list on the repository. pi inuences only the decision to offer a sample, while according
to the model it should also inuence the decision whether to list on the repository. wi was shown
to also inuence the decision whether to offer a sample or not so that both the proxy for visibility
and the proxy for brand recognition are a factor in the decision to offer a sample.
The `Heckman' model is the full model taking into account the selection effect, i.e. the fact
rms that can list on the repository are a sub-sample of all rms. I cannot use the same variables
in both the outcome and selection equation in a Heckman selection model, so I will use wi in
the outcome equation and ni in the selection equation. The results conrm that rms that offer
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samples have higher price (H2) and are less well known than other rms, and among those rms
that offer samples, those that sell via the repository are less well-known publishers (H4).
The `Sartori' model uses Sartori's estimator (Sartori (2003)), which allows me to use the
same explanatory variable for both the selection and outcome variable. This estimator is well-
adapted to a model in which selection among alternatives is non-random and quasi-simultaneous,
and identical explanatory variables inuence the decision. The results are essentially the same
in the two equations as those from the two separate probit models and considerably improve
the predictions compared to the Heckman probit model. wi; used jointly with ni turns out to
be a signicantly positive predictor of whether the rm lists its sample on the repository or not
(Sartori 2). As usual, ri does not turn out to be a signicant variable. There is thus both a `brand'
(or `product line' or `diversication') effect at work in addition to plain Internet visibility in the
decision whether to offer samples or not.
Finally, I also explored correlations patterns between price and visibility. Overall, there was
signicant correlation between price pi and visibility ln(ni) (0.405, signicant at the 1% level).
The correlation was not signicant among those rms that use strategy (S,NR) (0.330, not sig-
nicant), as expected from H5. The highest correlation, as expected from hypothesis H5, was
for rms that use strategy (S,R) (0.559, signicant at the 1% level). However, correlation was
also high, though less signicant, among rms that use strategy (NS) (0.470, signicant at the
5% level). This later correlation is not explained within the model and is not consistent with
hypothesis H5.
In conclusion to this part, I nd strong support for hypotheses H1, H2, H4 and for the rst
part of hypothesis H5. Hypothesis H3 is rejected (rms with higher value products are not more
likely to be selling via the repository). I also nd two additional effects not predicted in the
model: rms that are more visible (high ni) are less likely to offer samples, and rms that are
diversied are less likely to list on the repository. The discussion that will follow will throw some
light on those additional ndings, but I rst discuss additional possible factors:
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I explored other factors that might inuence the publisher's strategic decisions. The category
the software was in did not inuence the decision. I can thus reject the idea that offering sam-
ples is signicantly more difcult or easier in some software categories than in others, or that
conventions may have led consumers to expect to receive samples in some specic product cate-
gories and not in others. The identity of the software publisher, for those software publishers with
many software in the dataset10 did not improve the predictions from the model as well. Offering
samples or not does not therefore seem to be a global strategy set at the publisher's level for all
its software. Expressing visibility in relative terms vs. other software in the same category did
not change the results. However, there was little variation in average number of backlinks by
category, so it is not possible to test whether rms consider visibility relative to the repository
or relative to their competitors to decide on whether to list on the repository or not (the model
assumes they compare their visibility relative to the repository and then decide whether to list
there or not). Expressing price in relative terms did change the results and make them less sig-
nicant. This is consistent with the model if I assume that the distribution of types is the same
across categories. I also looked for systematic differences depending on whether network effects
or standards were particularly important in specic development areas, but no signicant effect
was observed.
I was mindful when collecting data to note whether the try-out version was `adware', i.e.
advertising nanced, or whether the software offered was merely a reader-only version for docu-
ments created by another program. There were however only very few of those types of try-out
versions in the sample, as adware and reader-only versions are usually freeware and not share-
ware. There was little evidence of competition based on try-out terms, which goes against the
thesis exposed in Bourreau and Lethiais (2007): Data on the terms of the try-out version was
collected for 84 of the 87 software that offered samples. Fifty-nine software put a limit on the
length of use of the try-out version, of which 40 chose to set a limit at 30 days of free trial and 13
offered 15 days. The maximum try-out period length was 90 days, the minimum 10. The other 24
software put various limits on the try-out version: 16 offered only a sub-sample of features, and
10Twelve from Microsoft, six from Avanquest, and ve from Adobe and from Symantec.
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the rest either limited the number of uses that could be made of the software or crippled output
from the software sample by for example putting watermarks on the documents processed by the
software. Three software did not seem to put any limitation on the use of the try-out version.
Table 1 shows that software publishers may take into account the likely reduction in willing-
ness to pay after sampling; samples were less likely to be available for software that responds
to punctual needs: only one backup software and three personal nance software chose strategy
S,NR. In that later category, samples were not available for that software that responds to tax
ling needs. However, the non-availability of samples in those categories may be due to the low
average price of software in those categories, as proposed in the model, rather than to any spe-
cic category effect. Indeed, `backup' and `personal nance' were the categories with the lowest
average price ($50) compared with the other categories where average price was around $200
(Table 3).
price (in $) ln(backlinks)
Category Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Backup 52.40 48.69 6.13 3.55
Database 155.24 137.67 5.48 3.16
Illustration 173.40 231.75 6.84 2.85
Personal nance 47.05 46.70 4.71 3.77
Programming 250.68 298.05 7.65 3.43
Word processors 174.00 212.39 6.06 3.93
Total 140.85 197.25 6.15 3.53
Table 3: Average and standard deviation of price and visibility of software by category.
There were two software that offered a sample on the repository but did not seem to be
offering samples on their website, which is not predicted by the model, and goes against H1.
However, this is only a very small portion of the sample. Still, there were instances in which rms
made it relatively difcult to obtain a sample, by for example requiring registration or sending
samples only by post rather than offering to download the try-out version on their website. As
hypothesized in the model, there was little use of price discrimination, as prices at the shareware
repository almost always the same as on the publisher's website. A few discrepancies in prices
were due to new versions of the software being offered on the website and/or to a degree of
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latency in price menu changes or in ranking changes: new products take some time to reach the
top of sales or downloads ranking.11 There was however some evidence of discrimination in
price between amazon.com and publishers' websites. Prices on amazon.com always were lower
or equal to those on the publisher's website. This was often due to amazon.com listing an older
version of the software that was no longer available on the website and had been replaced by a
newer, pricier version.
3 Discussion
This paper explained that some rms, those that are better known but whose product does not
compare too favorably with the existing less well-known competition, may want to avoid being
put into direct competition with lesser-known products, and thus decide to sell at higher prices to
consumers who are less aware of the alternatives. There may however be other explanations why
better known rms may decide not to list on repositories, or, if they list, for them not being listed
among the top selling rms on a shareware repository.
One explanation may be that consumers at the repository are in search of a bargain or of
a basic product, and would not anyway buy better known, higher value products. Following
on from this, a stigma may have become attached to listing on shareware repositories; it would
signal one is targeting the low end of the market. This would explain our nding that diversied
software publishers are less likely to list on the repository: the stigma associated with listing is
more important to rms that have a product line reputation to defend than to others. That stigma
would be self-fullling, as consumers in search of better value products would know not to go
to the repository. It may also be that consumers expect rms that do not offer samples to be
of good value because the mere fact the rm exists means other consumers trusted it enough
to buy its product without sampling. Firms that do offer samples would not be bought from
because offering a sample would be interpreted as a desperate measure to attract consumers to
11In the case of download.com, publishers are able to add downloads of older versions of their products to the
downloads of their newer versions, thus keeping the ranking of the older version.
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what is a lower value product. It might also be that such prejudice prevents established software
publishers from realizing the importance of such distribution channels. They might also not want
to encourage the emergence of those repositories by listing their products there. Consumers who
visit the repository may do so as a last resort when established software did not fulll their needs.
They would be looking for alternatives to software they already know, and that already known
software will usually be from one of the established software publishers. This means there would
be little point for established software publishers in listing on repositories that are geared toward
those consumers that are dissatised with their offering. Again, this would explain our additional
nding that diversied software publishers are less likely to list on the repository.
Consumers may be more condent in the value of products offered by highly visible rms,
since those rms will probably have attained high visibility by establishing their reputation over
time in their development area. Consumers' uncertainty about their taste for highly visible prod-
uct will be low, since highly visible products would normally have come to be so through adver-
tising campaigns, those campaigns allowing the consumer to evaluate the product in an alterna-
tive way to sampling. Better-known products would then not need to offer samples because that
would not bring much additional information to the consumer. This would explain our additional
nding that rms that are more visible (high ni) are less likely to offer samples
Finally, better known rms may be able to call upon more resources than other rms, and thus
be able to produce better value or more complete software, which would explain the correlation
between price and visibility among those rms that do not offer samples. This would be an
explanation for the correlation between price and visibility observed in the data among those
rms that do not offer samples.
Consumers' risk aversion might also play a role: higher priced, higher value products are
more risky than lower priced ones so that publishers of those products would be more likely to
offer samples in order to reduce uncertainty. It may also be that higher priced products are more
complex, and thus more difcult to evaluate from technical documentation alone, which means
offering a sample may be the most expedient option. Consumers would want to sample more
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complex products that require higher learning costs before committing themselves to buying
them. This would be an additional explanation for higher priced rms being more likely to offer
samples in the data.
Compound sampling strategies may arise and play a role if consumers are uncertain about
whether their need for the product is genuine or not. Those consumers would then use the prod-
ucts available on the repository as a way to test products in a product category. Products on the
repository would serve as a stepping stone into the use of those products that are not listed there.
An externality would thus be generated whereby trying a product reveals one's own taste for
the competitor's product. This can be likened to Crémer (1984) who examines how a monopoly
that offers coupons for the next purchase of its good discriminates between rst time and second
time buyers, offering low prices in a rst period to expand the number of experienced buyers
in the second period. In the context of this paper, the rm that does not offer samples benets
from the increase in the number of experienced buyers that is brought about by the existence of
free or cheap alternatives on the repository.12 This would explain why, from the data, rms that
are highly visible on the Internet are less likely to offer samples; they do not need to do so as
consumers try other products before buying their own.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows a signicant relationship between the choice of a strategy and the prominence
of a software publisher's website. Samples of lower value software from better-known publishers
are usually not available, while samples of higher value software from less well-known publishers
are often available. Less well-known software publishers tend to offer samples and be listed
among the top downloads on the repository.
This paper examined one aspect of the strategies followed by rms on the Internet and pro-
vides a better understanding of the Internet marketing environment. The decisions by rms to
12Another common strategy is to start with a low-range and cheap product and then gradually learn through
experience what one's needs are so as to later on buy a more sophisticated and more adequate product.
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offer samples was shown to depend on the proportion of consumers who are aware of shareware
repositories (are repositories well established or is their role limited?), on the consumers' abil-
ity to evaluate their need for a product (are consumers condent and knowledgeable, or do they
lack sufcient information on products sold via the Internet?), and on the extent to which search
engines and other Internet tools make the Internet a level playing eld where opportunities to
sell depend only on the product's own merit rather than on its visibility. The paper's empirical
nding, as explained in the context of the model that is presented in this paper, conrms that not
all consumers know of the existence of shareware repositories, so rms can protably exploit
less knowledgeable consumers even at the expense of sales on the repositories. Firms were also
shown to be able to build on their strong position on the Web; seen in another light, this means
the Internet does not make reputation or location irrelevant. Search technology is not used by
enough consumers or is not efcient enough to identify all available alternatives. This means
rms are not motivated to offer samples and provide consumers with all the information they
need to perfectly rank alternatives. Whether such a state of imperfect competition will persist
depends on whether rms keep on being able to advertise their product successfully enough to
bypass repositories and avoid having to offer samples of their products, or if on the contrary con-
sumers learn to better use Internet tools so rms are motivated to offer them more information
about their product.
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A The meaning of user ratings 
The meaning of user ratings as specified at www.download.com: 
1 star: Though it may have some useful functions, this product is unstable, 
riddled with spyware, or otherwise difficult to use. Download at your own risk. 
2 stars: This program has major flaws, though it is not completely without merit. 
I cannot recommend this download unless it is the only one of its kind. 
3 stars: This is a decent, solid program. It has no major flaws, but it didn’t 
knock my socks off. There may be similar programs that work better, have more 
features, or are easier to use. 
4 stars: Despite a few minor flaws, this program is generally excellent. I 
recommend this download. 
5 stars: I can’t recommend this product highly enough. 
The meaning of user ratings as specified at www.amazon.com: 
1 star: I hate it. 
2 star: I don’t like it. 
3 star: It’s OK. 
4 star: I like it. 
5 star: I love it! 
B Shareware repositories 
Name Website Backlinks
CNET 
Download 
http://www.download.com 604,000
Softpedia http://www.softpedia.com 26,200
Tucows http://www.tucows.com 25,800
Softpicks http://www.softpicks.net 12,500
Top Shareware http://www.topshareware.com 8,770
Jumbo http://www.jumbo.com 4,340
5 Star 
Shareware 
http://www.5star-shareware.com 3,340
Shareware 
Junkies 
http://www.sharewarejunkies.com 854
Paul's Pick http://paulspicks.com 518
Netscape 
shareware 
http://computing.netscape.com/comp
uting/download/shareware/main.tmpl
22
Table B1: Shareware repositories ranked by visibility. 
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The number of links to a website (backlinks) is used as a measure of its visibility or 
brand awareness (see empirical section of this paper). For purpose of comparison, there 
were 876,000 backlinks to amazon.com at the time of collection (May 2006). 
C Free and try-out software on the Internet: examples and 
motivations 
Name Description Motivation Examples 
Shareware Software given out for a limited 
period of time or with limited 
functionalities, with the option 
to buy later. 
Quality 
signalling, 
distribution. 
mIRC, 
WinZip, RSI 
Guard. 
Freeware Program distributed without its 
source code for free. 
Complementary 
services, 
upgrade. 
Wordweb, 
LeechFTP. 
Open source Program distributed with its 
source code for free. 
Collaborative 
work, ideology. 
Mozilla, 
Gimp, Linux, 
L
A
TEX. 
Basic 
Version 
Basic version of a software sold 
at a lower price than a fuller 
version. 
Brand line 
strategy, 
versioning. 
Microsoft 
Works, AVG 
Anti-Virus. 
Adware Free software displaying third-
party advertising that may be 
turned off only in exchange for 
payment. 
Advertising 
revenues. 
Opera, 
Software995, 
Gator. 
Reader 
version 
Program that only allows one to 
read documents created with the 
full version of the program. 
Network 
effects. 
Acrobat 
Reader, 
Realplayer, 
MediaPlayer, 
iTunes. 
Promotion Software initially sold at a 
reduced price or given out free 
during a promotional period. 
Lock in, market 
launch, 
visibility. 
Table C1: Free and try-out software: examples and motivations 
